ESI Lost After Duty To Preserve Had Been Triggered Results In Limited Sanction Under New Rule 37(e)

A federal court in Utah recently applied the newly amended Rule 37(e) and, in doing so, issued relatively limited sanctions following a finding of spoliation.   In First American Title Insurance Company, et al v. Northwest Title Insurance Agency, et al, No. 2:15-cv-00229, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118377 (D. Utah, Aug. 31, 2016), the plaintiff, First American, sued two ex-employee defendants for taking and using the company’s confidential and trade secret information for use at their new business they formed to compete with the company, defendant Northwest Title.  First American sent preservation demand letters to the defendants, and there was evidence that certain documents and ESI were destroyed prior to receipt of the preservation demand.  In seeking sanctions, First American argued that the defendant’s duty to preserve arose as soon as they set up Northwest.  However, the court held that defendants knew or should have known litigation was “imminent” only upon receipt of the preservation demand letters and, therefore, the defendant’s duty to preserve under Rule 37(e) was not triggered until that date.

Although this ruling resolved the issue regarding the alleged spoliation by Northwest Title that occurred prior to the duty to preserve being triggered, the decision also addressed additional allegations of spoliation that occurred after the duty had been triggered. However, the court found that sanctions were not warranted under Rule 37(e) because First American did not demonstrate that the electronic files at issue were actually “lost” or that they could not be restored or replaced through additional discovery.

The court also addressed the fact that an ex-employee who took numerous hard-copy documents and a thumb drive containing electronic First American files to her new job at Northwest Title subsequently lost the thumb drive and could not recall with specificity all of the ESI files or documents she took with her.  She admitted that some of the materials were used in the course of business for Northwest.   The evidence showed that the thumb drive likely was lost after the defendants’ receipt of the preservation demand.   Looking to Rule 37(e), the court found that First American was prejudiced by not having access to the thumb drive because the lost ESI went to the heart of First American’s claims that defendants took and misused confidential information, and there was no mechanism to enable First American to recover or restore the files through further discovery.

In determining the appropriate sanction, the court reasoned that because there was no evidence that the defendants “acted with intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation” under Rule 37(e), the sanctions of evidence preclusion, adverse inference, or monetary sanctions were not available and the court could only “order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.”  Based on this framework, the court concluded that the parties would be permitted to present evidence and argument to the jury regarding spoliation of the ESI and documents, but the jury would not be instructed regarding any presumption or inference regarding those materials.

This case highlights the new requirement of Rule 37(e) that a party seeking sanctions for spoliation of ESI must show that the ESI at issue is truly “lost,” and cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, as ESI is often stored in multiple locations.   The case also illustrates Rule 37’s new guidance for courts in determining appropriate sanctions specific to discovery disputes involving ESI.

Federal Court Compels Former Executive To Respond To Extensive Discovery Requests Despite High Cost

A federal court in Pennsylvania recently ordered a former executive to respond to costly and expansive discovery requests in a case where the former executive allegedly set up a competing business in violation of his employment agreement.  Although responding to the discovery was expected to be a costly endeavor, the Court in First Niagara Risk Management, Inc. v. John A. Folino (E.D. Penn. August 11, 2016) nevertheless rejected the defendant’s financial hardship argument based on the fact that he recently received $5 million for the sale of two companies to the plaintiff.

In this case, Folino began working for First Niagara in 2010 as its First Vice-President and Regional Director of Insurance for Western Pennsylvania after First Niagara paid Folino $5 million for the assets of the two business Folino owned.  As part of that sale, Folino signed an employment agreement containing non-solicitation and non-competition provisions that prevented him from competing with First Niagara.  Despite this agreement, First Niagara alleged that while working for First Niagara in 2015, Folino began working with another First Niagara employee to set up a business that directly competed with First Niagara.

During discovery, First Niagara filed a motion to permit the parties’ neutral eDiscovery vendor to conduct searches of all of Folino’s personal electronic devices and email accounts using roughly 100 separate terms and covering an almost a two and a half year period.  Folino objected to this request on the basis that it was overly broad, unduly burdensome, and excessively costly.

In granting First Niagara’s motion to compel the requested discovery, the Court found that although First Niagara’s discovery requests were “rather broad,” they nevertheless were proportional to the needs of the case.  In reaching its decision, the Court stated the following factors weighed in favor of granting First Niagara’s motion:

  • Information produced in discovery demonstrated that Folino was involved in forming the competing company and recruiting First Niagara employees to join the company;
  • Folino had access to the information at issue while First Niagara did not; and
  • The information sought was highly relevant to First Niagara’s claims.

As for Folino’s claim that compliance with the discovery requests was cost-prohibitive, the Court specifically found that Folino’s “complaints about cost ring hollow from someone who just sold two companies for over $5 million.”

As this case demonstrates, courts look at the totality of the facts before making a proportionality determination under the revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Although individual defendants frequently have strong arguments against being compelled to engage in costly e-discovery, parties are well advised to consider the financial status of their clients before arguing that requested discovery is cost-prohibitive.

A Party May Comply With Rule 34 By Identifying Its Search Parameters As Opposed To Identifying Withheld Documents

According to a recent decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, a party may satisfy its obligations under  Rule 34 when—in response a demand for the production of documents—the party states how the party limited its search for responsive documents, but does not specifically identify the documents that have been withheld.

In Rowan v. Sunflower Elec. Power Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91109 (D. Kan. July 13, 2016) (Case No. 15-cv-9227), a defendant, in response to certain requests for the production of documents, did not explicitly state whether any documents were being withheld pursuant to the defendant’s objections to those discovery requests nor did the defendant identify any specific documents that had been withheld.  Rather, the defendant simply described how it had limited its search for documents that may have been responsive to those particular discovery requests.

For example, in response to two requests the defendant stated that it “limited its search to the e-mail .PST files for project management for the subject project, and has produced all non-privileged e-mails and attachments identified therein relating to the subject project.”  Likewise, in response to two other discovery requests that sought certain bid analyses, the defendant simply stated that it had limited its search to bid proposals received for a particular project between two dates and to the evaluation and recommendation letters submitted for those bid proposals.  Similarly, in response to a document request seeking documents reflecting an investigation regarding a particular incident, the defendant stated that it had limited its search for responsive documents to an OSHA investigation, its own investigation report, another entity’s investigation report, and e-mail .PST files for the project at issue.

The plaintiff filed a motion to compel and argued that the defendant failed to meet its obligations under Rule 34(b)(2)(C), which states that an objection “must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”  This language was added to Rule 34 by the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that became effective on December 1, 2015.

The court disagreed with the plaintiff and denied the motion to compel. The court explained that the Advisory Committee note on the December 1, 2015 amendments to Rule 34 provide that “[a]n objection that states the limits that have controlled the search for responsive and relevant materials qualifies as a statement that the materials have been ‘withheld.’”  The court found that the defendant had complied with its obligations under Rule 34 by stating how it had limited its search for responsive documents. The court also noted that if the plaintiff wanted to learn more about whether additional documents existed, the plaintiff could explore that issue in future discovery.

This decision is an important reminder of how the producing party generally has the final say in determining how best conduct its search for ESI.  Furthermore, the producing party’s ability to identify the limitations or parameters it placed on its search for responsive documents—as opposed to specifically identifying all documents withheld—may provide parties with an important and potentially cost-saving alternative in discovery.

Court Rejects Burdensome Argument As It Relates To Litigation Holds

The importance of timely implementing a litigation hold cannot be overemphasized.  In Bruner v. American Honda Motor Company, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 62810 (S.D. Ala. May 12, 2016), the plaintiffs, who were involved in an accident involving a 2007 Honda Civic, sought potential e-mails related to airbags installed in Civics during a ten-year span encompassing the model year of the accident vehicle.  The defendant argued that under the applicable document retention policies, any such e-mails would have been destroyed after thirty days and, therefore, no such documents existed.  The defendant further asserted that it had undertaken a thorough search of its various electronic communication systems and had found no documents.

In response, the plaintiffs noted that the defendant’s contentions could not be accurate, as reports from one of the systems at issue, the Customer Retention Resolution System, made specific reference to e-mails but those e-mails were not produced.  Moreover, the plaintiffs noted that the defendant admittedly had not initiated a litigation hold, even though the judicial complaint had been filed a year earlier, and therefore potentially relevant e-mails continued to be destroyed.  The defendant’s only arguments in support of its failure to implement the litigation hold was that it believed its document retention policy was sufficient and (without any factual support) that initiation of a litigation hold would be unnecessarily burdensome.

The court disagreed, first noting that the defendant “has failed to offer any specific evidence as to how additional searches or a litigation hold will be especially burdensome or expensive.”  Then, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)’s obligation on parties to preserve ESI, the court understandably concluded that “[t]he deletion of potentially relevant e-mails since the instigation of this action is unreasonable, considering their potential importance to this litigation.  Additionally, the deletion of some responsive e-mails does not absolve Defendant of its obligation to thoroughly search for still-extant ESI.”

As a result, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel, ordering the defendant to undertake additional searches using plaintiff-provided search terms, and to immediately implement a litigation hold.  Fortunately for the defendant, the plaintiff did not seek attorney’s fees with their motion to compel and, following oral argument on the issue, the court concluded that none would be awarded.  Nevertheless, Bruner demonstrates the importance of why parties are well advised to initiate a litigation hold as early as possible and why an employer seeking to avoid production of ESI must be able to provide substantive support for its arguments regarding cost or other undue burden.

Federal Court In Washington Sanctions Attorney For Citing “Badly Out Of Date” Case Law

Defense counsel was sanctioned by a federal court in Washington for bringing a motion to compel in bad faith, with the court finding that defense counsel’s citation of case law analyzing a prior version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was “inexcusable.”

In Fulton v. Livingston Fin. LLC, (W.D. Wash.), Defendants cited case law analyzing the version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) that existed before the widely broadcasted amendments to that Rule took effect near the end of 2015.  Rule 26 governs the type of information that should be produced in discovery, and includes a list of elements for attorneys to contemplate when determining if a discovery request is proportional to the demands of the case.

In Fulton, Defendants had moved either to compel discovery or exclude certain medical evidence Plaintiff wished to present at trial.  Initially, the court found that found Defendants’ argument for seeking this information was unreasonable and constituted a misrepresentation to the court.  The court noted that the amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) “dramatically changed” what information is discoverable, and therefore defense counsel’s citations to outdated case law was a misrepresentation that warranted sanctions.

Although defense counsel argued that the amended version of Rule 26 may not be applicable, the court found that the amendments apply to all proceedings pending as of the effective date of the new Rule insofar as it is “just and practicable.”  Therefore, the court concluded that defense counsel had misrepresented the scope of discoverable information when he failed to note the proportionality standard, but instead used the outdated law.

The court then ruled that it had an inherent power to sanction if it specifically found bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith, regardless of whether a specific court order was violated.  Because the court found that defense counsel recklessly misrepresented the law and the facts to the court in an effort to limit Plaintiff’s evidence at trial, sanctions were appropriate.

The sanctions were significant as they came in two forms.  First, the court imposed a cost and fees award, and also directed the sanctioned attorney to provide the offending briefing to his senior firm counsel along with an explanation that he was being sanctioned for citing “badly out of date” law.  Second, the attorney was subject to a potential future disclosure requirement designed to deter future transgressions.  These punishments, “strikes one and two”, were imposed to punish counsel as well as sufficiently inform future courts to properly sanction any further bad faith conduct.

This case vividly demonstrates how important it is for attorneys to stay abreast of changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as substantive law, or else face the real possibly that courts will punish those attorneys who fail to do so.

Federal Court In Washington Denies Motion To Compel Restoration Of Backup Tapes

A federal court in Washington recently denied a motion to compel the production of archived emails stored on backup tapes, rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the defendants culpability in failing to preserve the emails in a more accessible format outweighed the burden and cost to the defendant of restoration.

In Elkharwily v. Franciscan Health System (W.D. Wash.), the defendant did not maintain an email archive on its servers; rather, it saved its employees emails to physical backup tapes on a monthly basis. Without restoring the backup tapes, the only emails accessible to the defendant were those that remained in the relevant custodians live email accounts in other words, the emails that the users had not deleted from their inboxes.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B), a party need not provide discovery … [when] not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The producing party has the burden of showing undue burden and cost, but, upon making that showing, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) places the burden on the requesting party to show good cause exists to produce the ESI in spite of the burden and cost.

The defendant in Elkharwily did not dispute that its backup tapes would contain at least some emails that were discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1), but it argued that obtaining those emails would impose undue burden and cost. Specifically, the defendant estimated that retrieving, restoring, and reviewing the emails archived on the backup tapes would cost $157,500.

The plaintiff did not contest the defendants cost estimate or otherwise dispute the defendants burden and cost arguments. Rather, the plaintiff argued that the defendant was at fault for the high cost of restoring the backup tapes, because the defendant should have preserved them in a more readily accessible format, starting from the first time that the plaintiff contended he had put the defendant on notice of the possibility of litigation.

The court found the plaintiffs blame-shifting to be unpersuasive, particularly in light of a dispute over when the defendant was on notice of the potential for litigation, for which the court found the defendants explanation to be more credible. What’s more, the plaintiff could not say with certainty what the emails on the backup tapes would show, or that any would even be responsive to the plaintiffs discovery requests. Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiff did not show good cause under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), and the court denied the motion to compel production of emails on the backup tapes. The court did allow the plaintiff to continue to pursue discovery of those emails, but only at his own expense.

This case provides important lessons for parties requesting ESI and for parties producing it. Parties requesting ESI should carefully examine cost estimates when faced with cost and burden objections, because the burden shifting that occurs following a showing of undue burden and cost makes a motion to compel much less likely to succeed. For parties producing ESI, this case provides yet another reminder that objections to discovery that would require restoration of physical backup tapes are often successful when they are supported by objective and credible cost estimates.

 

Unsupported And Exaggerated Assertions Regarding The Burden Of Production Will Not Persuade The Court

By now we’re all familiar with the language recently implemented in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, providing employers with some protection against unreasonable demands related to ESI: “A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).  Rule 26(b)(2)(B) further provides that the objecting party must show that the requested production is unduly costly or otherwise burdensome.  What is minimally required to establish that cost or burden likely varies by court but one recent case provides beneficial guidance on what is not sufficient.

In Mitchell v. Reliable Security, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 76128 (N.D. Ga. May 24, 2016), the plaintiff in a pregnancy discrimination case asked for the employer’s ESI production of relevant e-mails and spreadsheets, to be produced in native file format.  The employer objected, claiming that it would be more expensive – by $3,000 – to produce the requested documents in their native format than to convert and produce the documents as PDFs.  This contention itself is a head-scratcher.  Why would it be more expensive to produce documents in their original format than to convert them?  Not surprisingly, the employer did not provide any substantive explanation for this purported cost, a fact the court noted the plaintiff was quick to point out:

Defendant’s statement regarding the estimated additional costs to produce native files rather than PDF files is insufficient because Defendant did not explain how it arrived at the estimated cost it provided, did not provide an actual estimate from an ESI expert or vendor, and did not explain its contention that production of emails and spreadsheets in native format would require more paralegal time to manage the production of native emails; because defense counsel’s own marketing communications suggest that it employs discovery management software commonly used to streamline ESI production; because there are other free or low-cost means of production of the native files; and because Plaintiff’s counsel has offered to assist in downloading emails in electronic format to minimize costs and avoid the retention of an expert or vendor to do the same.

The court found the plaintiff’s position persuasive, noting that it was “at a loss to understand why the production of native documents is more costly than production of PDF files” and ordering the employer to produce the files in native format as requested.

While this case underscores the importance of detailing how and why producing requested ESI would be too costly or otherwise burdensome, it also demonstrates that, typically, it’s not worth fighting over the form of production.  If the opposing party wants the documents in native format, give it to them.  If they would rather have PDF documents, give them that.  While on occasion there may be a valid reason for objecting to production in native format (for example, the need for redaction – not an issue in the instant case – which cannot be accomplished in a native document), most of the time it will not be worth the time and expense (and, as happened here, the disgruntlement of the court) to fight over format.

Federal Court In Virginia Rejects Defendant’s Proportionality Argument

A federal court in Virginia recently granted a plaintiff’s motion to compel the defendant to search its computer systems for electronically stored information, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the requested ESI was “inaccessible” due to burden and cost and that the requested discovery was not proportional to the needs of the case.  In Wagoner v. Lewis Gale Med. Ctr., LLC (W.D. Va.), the plaintiff sued defendant Lewis Gale Medical Center alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The plaintiff had requested that the defendant search for the ESI maintained by two custodians over a four month time period and proposed a list of 14 search terms.  The defendant contended that it would cost over $20,000 just to collect the requested ESI, based on a cost estimate obtained by a third party vendor.  The defendant further estimated an additional $24,000 in costs to review the ESI prior to production, for a total estimated cost of roughly $45,000.  Based on these cost estimates, the defendant argued that the discovery should not be permitted because it is not proportional to the needs of the case in light of the plaintiff’s “limited potential recovery.”

In rejecting the defendant’s proportionality argument and granting plaintiff’s motion to compel, the court noted that the defendant “chose to use a system that did not automatically preserve emails for more than three days, and did not preserve emails in a readily searchable format, making it costly to produce relevant emails when faced with a lawsuit.”  The court also noted that proportionality is not solely a question of whether the particular discovery method is expensive.  The court pointed out that defendant failed to offer any alternative proposals to obtain the requested information other than to have the witnesses search their own computers for potentially responsive information, which the court found was insufficient.

The court also held that the defendant failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the ESI was “inaccessible,” noting that the mere fact that defendant could not conduct the ESI searches in house and would be forced to hire a vendor did not render the data inaccessible.  The court also noted that the estimate provided by the defendant’s proposed ESI vendor “seems exceedingly high” since the request ESI was limited to two custodians over a four month timeframe.

Lastly, the court also rejected the defendant’s request for cost shifting in light of the fact that “the ESI sought is reasonably accessible without undue burden or expense.”

This case serves as an important reminder that broad brush assertions of undue burden will not be accepted by the court.  While it certainly is important to provide the court with objective data and metrics to support an undue burden and/or proportionality argument, it is equally important that those calculations not be overstated.

May A Company “Preserve In Place” To Satisfy Its Preservation Obligations

A common question that often arises is whether to physically collect/copy a person’s e-mail account once that person is placed on a litigation hold.  Rather than copy the e-mail account, many companies will simply turn off the “auto-delete” function and issue the employee a preservation notice. By doing so, the company essentially is preserving in place.  Although some may question this method of preservation, it is no different than if an employee had a box of potentially relevant documents in his office and, rather than make a copy of the box of documents, the employee was instructed to continue to hold the box in his office until further notice.  In most situations, this should be sufficient to satisfy a company’s preservation obligations.

One caveat, however, relates to a custodian who may have an incentive not to preserve (e.g., the alleged harasser).  In this type of situation, i.e., where you have the proverbial fox guarding the hen house, several courts have questioned the wisdom of such a protocol and have sanctioned parties when e-mails were lost.  (See below.)  Therefore, for those central figures in a litigation who may have an incentive not to preserve, a copy should be made of their e-mail accounts.

The following authorities are illustrative of the principles discussed above:

  • Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e):  This newly amended rule now provided that “[i]f electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court [may issue the following sanctions…]”  One of the key points of this rule is the possibility for sanctions hinges on whether the party took “reasonable steps” to preserve information.  Therefore, the rule contemplates that information can still be lost or deleted, but if reasonable – but not perfect – steps were taken to preserve, then sanctions cannot be levied for the loss of that information.
  • The Sedona Principles For Electronic Document Production, Comment 6a:  This comment provides that “[r]esponding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronic data and documents.”  The comment cites to Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 FRD 212, 217 (SDNY 2003), noting there are various ways to manage electronic documents, and thus, many ways in which a party may comply with its obligations.
  • Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20353 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011):  The court sanctioned a party who relied on custodians to self-collect relevant e-mails for preservation.  Based on the insufficient and lackluster efforts taken to attempt to locate relevant documents, the court found that the party did not take reasonable steps to preserve.
  • Northington v. H&M Intl., 2011 WL 663055 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011):  The court held “[I]t is unreasonable to allow a party’s interested employees to make the decision about the relevance of such documents, especially when those same employees have the ability to permanently delete unfavorable email from a party’s system….  Most non-lawyer employees, whether marketing consultants or high school deans, do not have enough knowledge of the applicable law to correctly recognize which documents are relevant to a lawsuit and which are not.  Furthermore, employees are often reluctant to reveal their mistakes and misdeeds.”
  • Jones v. Bremen High School District 228, 2010 WL 2106640 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2010):  The court chastised the school district for allowing those alleged to have discriminated against the plaintiff to conduct their own review for evidence relating to her claims.  Moreover, even though most of the gaps in the e-mail production were filled by finding missing e-mails in other locations, the court still sanctioned the school district, determining that it was reckless and grossly negligent in its handling of the litigation hold.

At the end of the day, if the process works and no relevant e-mails are lost, a company should not be at risk for sanctions.  However, if e-mails are lost, the main question will be whether the company took reasonable steps to preserve the information.

If the lost e-mails were from a marginal employee with no meaningful stake in the litigation, then the mere fact that a litigation hold was issued to the employee should be enough to protect the company from sanctions.  (In this situation, the company will want to be able to show that the employee received the hold notice, understood what it meant, etc.  To this end, it will be very helpful if companies periodically issue reminder litigation hold notices.)  Alternatively, if the lost emails were in the account of a key figure in the litigation, then the court will look more closely into whether the company’s efforts were reasonable in that specific situation.

Explanation of the Legal Profession’s Remarkably Slow Adoption of Predictive Coding

Well-known predictive coding expert attorney, Maura Grossman, and her husband, noted information scientist, Gordon Cormack, recently began on article in Practical Law magazine with the assertion:

Adoption of TAR has been remarkably slow, considering the amount of attention these offerings have received since the publication of the first federal opinion approving TAR use (see Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).

Grossman & Cormack, Continuous Active Learning for TAR (Practical Law, April/May 2016).

Winners in Federal CourtTAR, which stands for Technology Assisted Review, is their favorite term for what the legal profession commonly calls predictive coding. I remember when our firm attained the landmark ruling in our Da Silva Moore case. I thought it would open a floodgate on new cases. It did not. But it did start a flood of judicial rulings approving predictive coding all around the country, and lately, around the world. See Eg. Pyrrho Investments v MWB PropertyEWHC 256 (Ch) (2/26/16). Judge Andrew Peck’s more recent ruling on the topic contains a good summary of the law. Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., 306 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). The bottom line is that at this point in time, late May 2016, the Bench is waiting for the Bar to catch up.

LoveAlthough I am known for my exuberant endorsement of predictive coding, this enthusiasm for new technology to find electronic evidence is still rare in the legal profession. Losey, R., Why I Love Predictive Coding: Making document review fun with Mr. EDR and Predictive Coding 3.0. (2/14/16). So why do I love this technology so much, and most other lawyers, not so much? It may have to do with the fact that I have been using computers since 1978 and am very used to pushing the technology edge. But that just explains why I was one of the first to knock on the door of predictive coding, not why I like the room. I have been an early adopter of many technologies that proved disappointing. (Anybody want to buy a slightly used iWatch?) No, I like it because it really works.

This in turn raises the question why have not all attorneys had this same reaction. If it really works for me, it should really work for everyone, right? And so everyone should be loving predictive coding, right? No. It is not working for everyone. Many have had unpleasant experiences with predictive coding. They left the room bored and frustrated. I am reminded of the old commercial, Where’s the beef? They went back to their old familiar keyword searches. Pity.

It took me a while to figure this out, that others were having failures and not talking about it. (Who can blame them?) In retrospect I should have seen this earlier. Still, it took Grossman and Cormack until 2015 to figure this out too. Interestingly, we have come to the same conclusion on causation. Bad software is not the main reason, although varying software quality among vendors is part of the explanation. Some software on the market is not that good, or does not even have bona fide predictive coding features using active machine learning. But these software differences only explain some of the dissatisfaction. The real reason for the failures is that attorneys have not been using the predictive coding features properly. They have been doing it wrong. That is why it did not work well for them. That is why many attorneys tried it out and never returned.

Grossman and Cormack explain this and provide their best-practice methods in the new article, Continuous Active Learning for TAR, and many other articles they have written since 2015. I read and recommend them all. I have shared my own best practices in my lengthy personal blog, Predictive Coding 3.0 article, part one and part two. Part one describes the history and part two describes the method. Our best practices are not exactly the same, but they are close and compatible. I have written a total of 59 articles on the subject now that are currently all online and freely available. I call the method Hybrid Multimodal and its basic steps are shown in the figure below.

predictive_coding-3.0

Feel free to drop me an email if you are an in-house counsel and want to know more about predictive coding best practices. Training on this topic is one of the services that we offer our clients. So too is the search for responsive evidence in litigated matters, or internal investigations, using our proven successful Hybrid Multimodal method of Predictive Coding document review.

 

 

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